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Targeted social distancing to mitigate pandemic
influenza can be designed through simulation of influenza's
spread within local community social contact networks. We
demonstrate this design for a stylized community represen-
tative of a small town in the United States. The critical
importance of children and teenagers in transmission of
influenza is first identified and targeted. For influenza as
infectious as 1957-58 Asian flu (≈50% infected), closing
schools and keeping children and teenagers at home
reduced the attack rate by >90%. For more infectious
strains, or transmission that is less focused on the young,
adults and the work environment must also be targeted.
Tailored to specific communities across the world, such
design would yield local defenses against a highly virulent
strain in the absence of vaccine and antiviral drugs.
A
t the start of an influenza pandemic, effective vaccine
and antiviral drugs may not be available to the gener-
al population (1,2). If the accompanying illness and death
rates of the virus strain are high, how might a community
respond to protect itself? Closing roads, restricting travel,
and community-level quarantine will enter discussions
(3,4). However, within a community, influenza spreads
from person to person through the social contact network.
Therefore, understanding and strategically controlling this
network during a period of pandemic is critical.
We describe how social contact network–focused miti-
gation can be designed. At the foundation of the design
process is a network-based simulation model for the spread
of influenza. We apply this model to a community of
10,000 persons connected within an overlapping, stylized,
social network representative of a small US town. After
study of the unmitigated transmission of influenza within
the community, we change the frequency of contact with-
in targeted groups and build combinations of strategies that
can contain the epidemic. Finally, we show how infectivi-
ty of the strain and underlying structure of the infectious
contact network influence the design of social distancing
strategies. In the absence of vaccine and antiviral drugs,
design for specific communities would defend against
highly virulent influenza.
Methods
The design process first creates an explicit social con-
tact network in which persons are linked to others in a
community. Spread of influenza within the network is then
simulated by imposing behavioral rules for persons, their
links, and the disease. These rules are modified to imple-
ment targeted mitigation strategies within the community,
the effectiveness of which is evaluated (5).
Contact Network
A network is created by specifying groups of given
sizes (or range of sizes) within which persons of specified
ages interact (e.g., school classes, households, clubs). The
average number of links per person within the group is also
specified because cliques form or are imposed (e.g., seat-
ing in a classroom). This number is used to construct a
within-group network that can take various forms. We used
fully connected, random, or ring networks for each group.
Random networks are formed by randomly choosing 2 per-
sons within the group and linking them. This process is
repeated until the number of links within the group yields
the specified average (each person will have a different
number of links). The ring is formed by first placing per-
sons next to neighbors and linking them to form a com-
plete circle. Additional links are then made to next nearest
neighbors symmetrically around the ring. Finally, links
within a group are given an average frequency of contact
per day. With this approach, a network can be built from
the experience of community members to exhibit the clus-
tered yet small-world characteristics (6) and overlapping
quality of a structured community (7,8).
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took advantage of the diverse backgrounds of the authors
(1 of whom is a teenager). The population of 10,000 con-
formed to the 2000 Census (9) and consisted of children
(<11 years of age, 17.7%), teenagers (12–18 years of age,
11.3%), adults (19–64 years of age, 58.5%), and older
adults (>65 years of age, 12.5%). All persons belonged to
multiple groups, each associated with a subnetwork of
links that reflected their lives within the community
(Figure 1, Table 1). Households were composed of fami-
lies (adults with children or teenagers), adults, or older
adults. The age-class makeup and size of households con-
formed to the 2000 Census (9). All persons within each
household were linked to each other with mean link con-
tact frequencies of 6/day. Every person also belonged to 1
multiage extended family (or neighborhood) group (mean
membership 12.5, mean link contact frequency 1/day).
All children and teenagers attended preschool or
school; children attended 1 class/day, while teenagers
attended 6 (classes of 20 to 35 children or teenagers). All
adults went to work daily, where they interacted with other
adults (work group size 10–50), and all older adults attend-
ed gatherings with other older adults (gathering size 5–20).
For links within school classes, work, and gatherings of
older adults, we assumed the simplest subnetwork that
imposes local clustering: a ring lattice in which a person is
linked to 2 (for children or teenager classes and gatherings
of older adults) or 3 (adult work) neighboring persons on
each side along the ring. Mean link contact frequencies for
children in a class are 6/day. Teenager classes, adult work,
and gatherings of older adults have mean link contact fre-
quencies of 1/day.
To represent additional within-age class interactions,
such as extracurricular activities, playgrounds, bowling
leagues, or friends, persons are randomly linked to an aver-
age of 3 other persons of the same age class (mean link
contact frequency 1/day). Finally, to emulate a somewhat
patterned set of random contacts from commercial transac-
tions and other ventures into public spaces, we impose a
random overall network across all age classes with a mean
of 25 links/person to yield 1 contact/person/day (mean link
contact frequency 0.04/day).
Behavioral Rules
The spread of influenza within the contact network is
modeled as a series of 2 classes of events: transition of a
person between disease states and person-to-person trans-
mission of influenza. Disease state transitions follow the
natural history of influenza (Figure 2). After the latent
state, an infected person transitions to an infectious
presymptomatic state or an infectious asymptomatic state
with probability pS or 1 –  pS, respectively. Those with
symptoms either stay home with probability pH, thus
influencing their contacts, or continue to circulate with
probability 1 – pH. Infected asymptomatic persons contin-
ue interacting without behavioral changes. Persons who
are symptomatic die or become immune with probability
pM or 1 – pM, respectively, and asymptomatic persons
become immune. Because this final transition does not
influence the spread of the disease, we use pM = 0.
Person-to-person transmission events are evaluated at
the beginning of each period during which a person is
infectious. Assuming contact events are statistically inde-
pendent, a transmission time for each infectious person’s
links within the contact network is chosen from an expo-
nential distribution with a mean of the link’s contact fre-
quency scaled by ID × IR × IA  × SP  × SA, where ID is the
infectivity of the disease, IR is the relative infectivity of the
disease state, SP is the susceptibility of people to the disease
(here taken as 1.0), IA is the relative infectivity of the per-
son who is transmitting, and SA is the relative susceptibility
of the person receiving. If the transmission time is less than
the period during which the person will be in an infectious
state (also chosen from an exponential distribution with the
prescribed means; Figure 2), transmission is scheduled at
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Figure 1. Groups and typical person-to-person links for a model
teenager. The teenager (T1) belongs to a household (fully con-
nected network, mean link contact frequency 6/day), an extended
family or neighborhood (fully connected network, mean link con-
tact frequency 1/day), and 6 school classes (ring network with con-
nections to 2 other teenagers on each side as shown in black;
purple links denote connections of other teenagers within the
class; mean link contact frequency 1/day). Two random networks
are also imposed, 1 within the age group (teenager random, aver-
age of 3 links/teenager, mean link contact frequency of 1/day), and
1 across all age groups (overall random, average of 25 links/per-
son [not all links shown], mean link contact frequency of 0.04/day).the chosen time. Otherwise, transmission along that link
does not occur during that period. All transmission param-
eters and contact frequencies may be modified in each of
the states, as well as varied among age classes by relative
scaling factors such as IR. In this way, disease representa-
tions and mitigation strategies are implemented.
Most influenza-specific parameters used here reflect
those of (10,11). We approximated normal influenza viral
shedding data (15) with a time varying infectivity through
choice of state periods and relative infectivity scaling fac-
tors (Figures 2 and 3). The latent period is a constant (0.75
days) followed by a variable period (mean 0.5 days). The
presymptomatic period (mean 0.5 days) has an IR of 0.25
after which it increased to 1.0 for the first part of the symp-
tomatic period (mean 0.5 days), when viral shedding is
maximum and coughing begins. IR is then reduced to 0.375
for the remainder of the infectious symptomatic period
(mean 1 day). For infectious asymptomatic persons, IR was
set at 0.25 for a mean period of 2.0 days, making these per-
sons half as infective as those with symptoms. We chose
pS as 0.5, pH as 0.5 for adults and older adults and pH as
0.9 for children and teenagers. When a person is in the
symptomatic stay-home state, we reduce the frequency of
all nonhousehold connections by 90%. Because children
and teenagers have closer contact with others and are less
likely to wash hands or control coughs (16), they are more
infective and susceptible: IA and SA are both 1.5 for chil-
dren, 1.25 for teenagers, and 1.0 for adults and older
Social Distancing Design for Pandemic Influenza
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Figure 2. Natural history of influenza in
our model. Duration of each state for a
given person is chosen from an expo-
nential distribution. State relative infec-
tivity (IR) and mean state duration were
chosen to reflect the infectivity varia-
tion of Ferguson et al. (10,11) (see
Figure 3). Transition probabilities
between presymptomatic and post-
symptomatic states are also noted. For
symptomatic persons who stay at
home, link frequencies outside the
household are reduced by 90%. adults. Finally, ID is adjusted to yield specified attack rates
within the community.
Results
We first show the spread of influenza within our unmit-
igated base case defined with parameters specified above
and with ID chosen to yield an infected attack rate ≈50% to
reflect the 1957–58 Asian influenza pandemic (10). Unless
otherwise noted, we report infected attack rates and refer
to them as simply attack rates rather than reporting the ill-
ness attack rate which is half of this value (pS = 0.5). We
then demonstrate the design of effective local mitigation
strategies for the base case that focus on targeted social
distancing. Finally, we extend these results to design
strategies for more infectious strains and for changes to the
underlying infectious contact network that deemphasize
the role of children and teenagers.
All simulations are initialized by infecting 10 random-
ly chosen adults with the assumption that adults are first to
be infected through business travel or interaction with vis-
itors from outside the community (5). Some of these initial
infections instigate others and grow into an epidemic.
Results vary across multiple realizations of the communi-
ty network and random choice of initially infected adults
(controlled by random number seed) not all of which yield
an epidemic, defined when the number infected is >1% of
the population. For every set of parameters, we conducted
>100 simulations with different random number seeds and
collected statistics for all simulations and for only those
that result in epidemics (Table 2).
Unmitigated Base Case
The sequence of infected persons can be represented as
an expanding network of infectious transmissions
(Figure 4). The number of secondary infections produced
by an infected person, or branching factor, is easily visual-
ized within the infectious contact network. The average
branching factor depends on the person’s age class and
generation during the epidemic (Figure 5A). The maxi-
mum value within the first 10 generations is 2.05 (standard
deviation [SD] 0.57) for children, 2.09 (SD 0.72) for
teenagers, 1.11 (SD 0.43) for adults, 0.81 (SD 0.47) for
older adults, and 1.54 (SD 0.36) for the entire population.
Variability (large SD, especially for specific age classes)
reflects the heterogeneity inherent within community con-
tact networks of this size (Figure 5B).
The backbone of infectious contact networks is formed
primarily of children and teenagers with infectious trans-
missions mostly in the household, neighborhood, and
schools. Infectious transmissions are highest in households
without older adults (39%, SD 3%), followed by extended
families or neighborhoods (25%, SD 1%), schools (19%,
SD 1%), work (7%, SD 2%), combined random groups
(9%, SD 2%), and households with older adults (1%, SD
0.1%). On average, 78% (SD 2%) of children and 71%
(SD 3%) of teenagers become infected. Adults (attack rate
44% of adults, SD 2%) get influenza mainly from children,
teenagers, and other adults within the family. Older adults,
who contact children and teenagers only through the
extended family or neighborhoods and the random overall
network, are relatively isolated (attack rate 23% of older
adults, SD 2%).
Children and teenagers compose only 29% of the pop-
ulation yet they are responsible for 59% (SD 4.5%) of
infectious contacts, adults for 38% (SD 7.9%), and older
adults for 3% (SD 0.6%) (Table 3). Approx-imately half of
infectious contacts of either children or teenagers are with-
in the same age class (19%, SD 0.8% and 9%, SD 0.7%,
respectively). Adults get influenza from children or
teenagers at approximately the same frequency (24%, SD
1.6%) as from other adults (26%, SD 5.9%). Older adults
are equally likely to get influenza from children or
teenagers as from adults or older adults (2%, SD 0.3%).
Transmission to children or teenagers from adults is 10%
(SD 1.8%) and nearly none by older adults. These trans-
mission results are supported by recent field studies that
show children who go to preschool or school are more
likely to contact influenza and their   family members are
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Figure 3. Functional behavior of IR with time. Although infectivity of
an asymptomatic person is constant with time (IR 0.25), infectivity
of a symptomatic person changes from infectious presymptomatic
(IR 0.25) to early infectious symptomatic (IR 1.0) to late sympto-
matic (IR 0.375). A symptomatic person with mean state periods
as denoted in Figure 2 is shown in gray (asymptomatic with
dashed line). Because state periods are different for each person
(given by exponential distributions) and half of the infected per-
sons are asymptomatic, the average population scale IR in time is
smoothed as shown in blue. Both disease state periods and IR  val-
ues were chosen to honor the clinically derived natural history of
influenza (12–14), scaled viral shedding data shown as open red
squares (15), and the model of Ferguson et al. (10,11). also more likely to become ill (17,18) as well as a person
that is also more likely to be infected when exposed to
children or teenagers than to adults (14).
Reasonable correspondence is observed (Figure 6)
between age class–specific attack rates and those of past
pandemics (19–21). Infections transmitted within each
environment are also consistent with other simulation
studies (10–14). The maximum value of the overall
branching factor (Figure 5) reflects the often-cited repro-
ductive number Ro. However, how Ro should be calculated
from small-community data such as ours is ambiguous
(10,11,14). To estimate Ro, we pooled results across 100
communities (simulations) to reflect a population of 1 mil-
lion (Figure 5B). The maximum value of the bulk ratio
(new infections to old) within the first 10 generations is
1.6, and we choose it as our estimate of Ro. An Ro of 1.6
with an attack rate of 50% matches recent pandemic simu-
lation results (10,14) and lies within the range (1.5–1.7) for
the 1957–58 influenza pandemic (Figure 5B) (10).
Base Case–Targeted Social Distancing
High infectiousness and a high number of contacts,
many like-to-like, create a zone of high infectious contact
centered on children and teenagers within the community’s
social network. Targeting this zone can protect the commu-
nity at large. 
First, we examined closing schools. Although contacts
in classes are removed, those in all other groups may
increase because children and teenagers now spend more
time at home, in neighborhoods, with friends, and in pub-
lic spaces. We assume that school closure at a minimum
doubles household contacts. Closing schools with 90%
compliance the day after 10 symptomatic cases reduces the
attack rate by 22% (Table 2). However, if we assume that
school closure doubles all link contact frequencies for chil-
dren or teenagers within their nonschool groups, attack
rates are increased by 18% (Table 2).
Alternatively, we send all children and teenagers home
after school closure to remain for the duration of the pan-
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Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 12, No. 11, November 2006 1675demic. Now contact frequencies are reduced by 90% for
all groups that contain only children or teenagers (classes
and their random networks) and doubled, as before, for
children or teenagers in households. In the extended fami-
ly or neighborhood and the random overall networks, child
or teenager contact frequencies are also reduced by 90%.
Thus, although children and teenagers are restricted to the
home, adults and older adults go about their day-to-day
routines, except that they avoid children or teenagers who
are not household members. Imposing this strategy the day
after 10 symptomatic cases reduces attack rates by 93%
(Table 2). Waiting until 80 symptomatic cases reduces
attack rates by 73% (Figure 7A).
To evaluate the tradeoff between effectiveness and pub-
lic compliance, we reduced the percentage of nonschool
and nonhousehold contacts that have their frequencies
reduced with the child and teenager stay-at-home policy
(Figure 7B). At 50% compliance, attack rates can be
reduced by 68% (Table 2). Reduction in compliance also
increases the time scales for the epidemic. Epidemics
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Figure 4. Initial growth of an infectious contact network.
Colored rectangles denote persons of designated age
class, and colored arrows denote groups within which
the infectious transmission takes place. In this exam-
ple, from the adult initial seed (large purple rectangle),
2 household contacts (light purple arrows) bring
influenza to the middle or high school (blue arrows)
where it spreads to other teenagers. Teenagers then
spread influenza to children in households who spread
it to other children in the elementary schools. Children
and teenagers form the backbone of the infectious con-
tact network and are critical to its spread; infectious
transmissions occur mostly in the household, neighbor-
hood, and schools. 
Figure 5. Branching factor and the approximation of the reproductive number Ro. A) Overall and age class–specific branching factors as
a function of generation averaged over 100 simulations. The standard deviations of these averages can be large (<0.72 at the peak value
for teenagers) and reflect the heterogeneity within the person contact networks and from community to community. B) Branching factors
for overall average and 3 example simulations compared with the bulk ratio of infections in a generation to those in the previous gener-
ation pooled across 100 simulations. We chose the maximum value of the bulk ratio (1.6) as an approximation of the reproductive num-
ber Ro. lengthen above the base case and reach a factor of ≈1.8 at
40% compliance (Figure 7B).
Other social distancing strategies can be considered.
Because children outnumber teenagers and children are
more infective and susceptible, what happens if only chil-
dren are distanced, while teenagers attend school and fol-
low their usual routines? At 90% compliance, this strategy
reduces attack rates by 47% (Table 2). What if all sick per-
sons remain at home when symptomatic? At 90% compli-
ance this strategy reduces attack rate by 20% (<25% of
infectious persons are influenced as pS × pH = 0.25 for
adults only) (Table 2).
More Infective Strains and Contact Networks 
with Less Emphasis on the Young
We have modeled an influenza strain with an infectivi-
ty representative of the 1957–58 Asian influenza pandem-
ic and a social contact network reflective of a stylized US
Social Distancing Design for Pandemic Influenza
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Figure 6. Comparison of simulated age class–specific illness
attack rates with past pandemics. Simulated illness attack rates
(half the infectious attack rate) for the unmitigated base case are
close to those found in studies of historic pandemics in 1957 (19),
1968 (20), and 1918 (21). Notable differences are the 1968 Hong
Kong flu, which had more emphasis on adults, and the 1957–58
Asian flu, which had more emphasis on youth; however, historic
data are inherently uncertain. Closer correspondence to either of
these 2 cases could be achieved through changes in IA or SA or
modification of the underlying social contact network as it was like-
ly different from that of a small town of today. 
Figure 7: Fraction of  unmitigated base case attack rate for target-
ed social distancing of children and teenagers as a function of A)
implementation policy threshold given by the number of sympto-
matic cases (compliance at 90%) and B) compliance with staying
at home (implementation policy threshold at 10 symptomatic
cases, 0% compliance closes schools alone). Each point repre-
sents the average of simulations of 100 that yielded epidemics
(>100 infected). Standard deviations for variation of threshold are
<3% of the total population. However, for compliance variation,
standard deviations increase to a maximum of 7% of the total pop-
ulation at a compliance of 30%.town. Although results for the unmitigated base case yield
age class–specific attack rates similar to those for past epi-
demics (Figure 6), will the  targeted social distancing
strategies found above remain effective if 1) the strain is
more infective or 2) the importance of the young is deem-
phasized?
To explore these questions, we considered 3 increases
in disease infectivity ID by factors of 1.25 (attack rate
≈66%, Ro ≈ 1.8), 1.5 (attack rate ≈75%, Ro ≈ 2.0), and 2.0
(attack rate ≈86%, Ro ≈2.4). These increases encompass
and exceed the 1918–19 Spanish influenza pandemic (Ro
1.8–2.0) (10). We also sequentially removed enhanced
transmission by children and teenagers and thus the zone
of high infectious contact that we have designed social dis-
tancing strategies to target. We created 3 variations: the
first removed relative infectivity and susceptibility
enhancement of children and teenagers (IA and  SA 1.0)
(variation 1); the second increased frequency of contact
within the work environment by a factor of 4 to give adults
the same number of contacts as younger persons (variation
2); and the third combined variations 1 and 2. For each of
the resulting set of 4 cases (base, variation 1, variation 2,
and variation 1 and 2), ID was altered slightly to maintain
the reference of ≈50% infected attack rate for Ro ≈1.6.
As  ID increases, age specific–attack rates increase
(Table 4). As we remove differences in the number of con-
tacts and/or the relative infectivity and susceptibility (IA,
SA) between young and adults, the infected attack rates sys-
tematically shift from young persons to adults (Figure 8).
These results suggest that for such situations, social dis-
tancing strategies must be devised that focus on more than
children and teenagers alone.
To find effective targeted social distancing strategy
combinations across the range of disease infectivity and
infectious contact networks, we formulated 5 strategies
and applied them individually and in combination:
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Figure 8. Unmitigated age-specific attack rate results for disease
infectivity (ID) factors of 1.0 and 2.0 and base case, variation 1
(removal of relative infectivity and susceptibility), variation 2
(increase in work group frequency of contact to give all children,
teenagers, and adults the same overall contact frequencies), and
variations 1 and 2 combined. Illness attack rates shown in Figure
6 are half these values. 1) school closure (S) where the contact frequency within
schools was reduced 90% and children and teenagers
household contacts were doubled; 2) children and
teenagers social distancing (CTsd) where their contact fre-
quencies in all nonhousehold and nonschool groups were
reduced 90% and their household contacts doubled; 3)
adult and older adult social distancing (AOAsd), where
their contact frequencies in all nonhousehold and non-
work groups were reduced 90% and household contacts
doubled; 4) liberal leave (LL), where all children and
teenagers and 90% of adults withdraw to the home when
symptomatic; and 5) work social distancing (Wsd) where
the contact frequency within work groups was reduced
50%. For each combination, we implemented the strate-
gy(ies) the day after 10 symptomatic cases and conducted
100 simulations.
As ID increases, more strategies must be combined to
keep the attack rate <10% (Table 5, shaded values). As
children and teenagers become less prominent, targeting
adults becomes important, even at an ID factor of 1. For an
ID factor of 1.5 (as infective as the 1918–19 Spanish
influenza pandemic) and across all variations, both the
young and adults must be targeted and all strategies must
be implemented to effectively mitigate the epidemic.
However, for an ID factor of 2.0, we can at best reduce the
attack rate to 20–40% through full strategy combination,
not ideal but still a significant benefit.
Discussion
Results for our stylized small town suggest that target-
ed social distancing strategies can be designed to effective-
ly mitigate the local progression of pandemic influenza
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tivity similar to that of the 1957–58 Asian influenza pan-
demic, targeting children and teenagers, by not only
closing schools but also by keeping these age classes at
home, was effective. However, given uncertainty in the
infectivity of the influenza strain, underlying social contact
network, or relative infectivity/susceptibility of the young
versus adults, planning to implement strategies that also
target adults and the work environment is prudent. To mit-
igate a strain with infectivity similar to that of the 1918–19
Spanish influenza pandemic, simulations suggest that all
young and adults must be targeted regardless of the likely
enhanced transmission by the young. 
Implementation of social distancing strategies is chal-
lenging. They likely must be imposed for the duration of
the local epidemic and possibly until a strain-specific vac-
cine is developed and distributed. If compliance with the
strategy is high over this period, an epidemic within a
community can be averted. However, if neighboring com-
munities do not also use these interventions, infected
neighbors will continue to introduce influenza and prolong
the local epidemic, albeit at a depressed level more easily
accommodated by healthcare systems. 
Our design approach explicitly implements disease-
host interaction within the social contact network where
the disease spreads. Measuring contact networks within
communities for the spread of infectious diseases requires
focused research that combines sociology, public health,
and epidemiology. Such networks will likely differ across
cultures, between urban and rural communities, and with
community size. With the aid of detailed demographic
data, expert elicitation of social scientists and community
members, behavioral surveys, and possibly experiments, a
network could be constructed for any community of inter-
est. Configurations that consider, for example, college
campuses or military reservations may be of use given that
the highest death rate of any group in the 1918–19 Spanish
influenza pandemic was in young adults (22).
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listeriosis, and takes place every 3 to 4
years. The 16th international conference
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of current research and trends related to
Listeria, including pathogenesis, 
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